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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The

National

Association

for

Public

Defense

(“NAPD”) is an association of more than 14,000 attorneys, investigators, social workers, administrators and
others professionals who fulfill constitutional mandates
to deliver public defense representation throughout all
U.S. states and territories. NAPD members advocate for
clients in jails, courtrooms, and communities, and are
experts in the theory and practice of evidence-based
quality service to people who are charged with crimes
but who cannot afford to hire counsel. They serve in
state, county, and local systems through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel who litigate juvenile, capital and appellate cases through a diversity of traditional and holistic practice models.
Moreover,
providing

NAPD’s

legal

membership

representation

includes
through

all

the

staff

Common-

wealth’s Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) as
well as over 100 assigned counsel in Massachusetts. CPCS
leaders are active in NAPD leadership through committee
work and as faculty for the annual NAPD Leadership Institute. CPCS also has shared thousands of pages of crucial defender trial resources

with public defenders

across that nation through MyGideon, NAPD’s secure public defense library.

This partnership gives NAPD a strong interest in
maintaining access to the courts and fair, reliable case
outcomes through the provision of quality public defense
service for the people of Massachusetts. In addition,
NAPD’s insight into the real-world effects of criminal
convictions on individuals and their families anchors
our strong interest in preventing the systemic overload
and breakdown of public defense in the Commonwealth.
Based on the foregoing factors, we hope the Court will
find our perspective helpful.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
NAPD hereby accepts and adopts the Statements of
the Case and Facts as set forth in the Corrected Joint
Brief of Petitioners and the Intervener.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As the highest courts in Florida, Missouri, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania have demonstrated, systemic relief is necessary and appropriate to cure systemic failures that deny access to courts by imposing
overwhelming demands on struggling public defense systems. Government misconduct created exactly that type of
constitutional crisis by flooding the Commonwealth’s
criminal legal system with 24,000 Dookhan cases. New
revelations

of

even

more

corruption

in

the

Common-

wealth’s forensic sciences system are now anticipated to
- 2 -

exacerbate that crisis by adding another 18,000 Farak
wrongful-conviction cases. At the same time, the District Attorneys have undermined progress on fair, reliable case-by-case resolution of the Dookhan convictions
by issuing misleading and ineffective communications regarding who is eligible to cure the government’s misconduct, how they should obtain relief, and when they
must do so.
These developments underscore the unworkability of
the current case-by-case approach to remedying the government misconduct at issue here. They demonstrate the
compelling and immediate need for this Court to grant
Petitioners’ requested relief by ordering these convictions vacated with prejudice, or with a severely limited
opportunity for district attorneys to justify refiling
charges in specific cases that are supported by untainted evidence and for the defense of which the Commonwealth’s public defense attorneys have sufficient resources to provide timely, quality representation. Any
other resolution only exacerbates the ongoing harm to
thousands of people from egregious government misconduct.

- 3 -

ARGUMENT
I.

SYSTEMIC RELIEF IS REQUIRED TO CURE A SYSTEMIC
TAINT TO CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS THAT HAS OVERLOADED
THE COMMONWEALTH’S PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM.
A. Systemic Taint is Causing Systemic Harm
State courts across the country have approved sys-

temic relief as the necessary and appropriate response
to constitutional crises created by systemic overload of
public defense systems, such as the crisis created by
government misconduct in the Dookhan cases. The Florida
Supreme Court

succinctly captured

why such systemic

failings require a systemic remedy, when swamped public
defenders urged that case-by-case resolution of the crisis was unworkable:
In extreme circumstances where a problem is
system-wide, the courts should not address the
problem on a piecemeal case-by-case basis.
This approach wastes judicial resources on redundant inquiries.
Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v.
State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013). The Court further
reasoned

that

“systemic

aggregate

relief”

prevented

courts from being “clogged with hundreds of individual
motions” that would be “tantamount to applying a band
aid to an open head wound.”

Id.

As demonstrated below, systemic relief is equally
necessary with respect to the convictions tainted by
what this Court has determined to be egregious misconduct attributable to the Commonwealth. This Court pre-

- 4 -

viously ruled that, where Commonwealth prosecutors relied on the tainted evidence at issue here, each defendant “is entitled to a conclusive presumption that … misconduct occurred[,] that it was egregious, and that it
is attributable to the Commonwealth.”

Commonwealth v.

Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 338 (2014). Yet despite the “conclusive presumption” of “egregious” wrongdoing, the current case-by-case approach to curing that wrong has left
the vast majority of the Dookhan convictions in full
effect today. Indeed, only about six percent (6%) of
defendants entitled to that presumption have even had
motions to vacate filed on their behalf under the current
case-by-case approach, much less had them resolved.

See

R.App. 1938-40, ¶¶ 3, 8-9.
These facts show that the case-by-case, “conclusive
presumption” approach is not just unworkable, but that
this approach has created exactly the type of backlog
decried by the Florida Supreme Court.

Moreover, the

Massachusetts backlog is causing even more immediate,
serious, and tangible harm to these individuals and
their families.

These tainted convictions are inflict-

ing myriad state and federal collateral consequences
that block access to jobs, housing, support for education, and other resources that promote productive participation in society. See R.App. 1710-14, ¶¶ 4-8; American Bar Association, National Inventory of Collateral

- 5 -

Consequences of Conviction (Federal), http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/

?jurisdiction=1000;

id.

abacollateralconse-

(Massachusetts)

http://www.

quences.org/search/?jurisdiction=25; see also Margaret
Colgate Love, Jenny Roberts, & Cecilia Klingele, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Law, Policy, and Practice (2016).
Imposition of these immediate, tangible harms is
all the more unjust because the majority of the tainted
convictions involve lower-level drug possession charges
that prosecutors chose to pursue in District Court. R.
App. 1818 (62% of cases are possession-only); id. at
1940 (90% of cases were prosecuted in District Court).
Jurisdictions across the country are decriminalizing,
dismissing, and diverting these types of low-level drug
charges in order to refocus scarce resources on more
serious crimes. See Human Rights Watch & American Civil
Liberties Union, Every 25 Seconds: The Human Toll of
Criminalizing Drug Use in the United States 184 (2016);
National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration
in

the

United

States:

Exploring Causes and Consequences 352-353(2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 155 (2015). Indeed, reducing the flood
of low-level cases in criminal legal systems is one way
to reduce the risk of tainted pleas and wrongful con-
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victions such as those at issue here. See Robert Boruchowitz, et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts 20-27
(2009).
B. Systemic Harm Requires Systemic Relief
In light of these facts, it is unsurprising that
other courts have joined Florida’s in ordering systemic
relief to address systemic overload of public defense
providers, and in doing so through the exercise of their
inherent judicial authority and responsibility to supervise the fair administration of justice. Significantly, courts in these cases are acknowledging that
systemic overload of the public defense function requires critical analysis of system priorities in order
to focus resources on the most serious cases.
Indeed, Florida courts have invoked systemic relief
not just once but repeatedly. In the case discussed
above, Public Defender v. Florida, the state Supreme
Court confronted a statute that forbade trial judges
from granting motions to withdraw by public defenders
who claimed that excessive caseloads created conflicts
of interest.

The Court invoked its inherent supervisory

authority to hold the statute unconstitutional as applied and to order class-based relief. 115 So. 3d 261,
276–277.

More specifically, the Court affirmed a trial
- 7 -

court order allowing defenders categorically to refuse
appointments in low-level felony cases. Id. at 271-272.
In so ruling, the Florida Court expressly held that
case-by-case, ex post facto analysis was “inappropriate”
for addressing system-wide failure in the provision of
public defense.

Id. at 276–277. Observing “how the ex-

cessive caseload ha[d] impacted the Public Defender’s
representation of indigent defendants,” based on the
“systematic inability” to perform basic attorney functions, the Court authorized “aggregate/systematic motions to withdraw . . . in circumstances where there is
an office-wide or wide-spread problem as to effective
representation.”

Id. at 273-74 & n.8.

The Court further stressed that “[i]n extreme circumstances where a problem is system-wide, the courts
should not address the problem on a piecemeal case-bycase basis.”

Id.

The Court also identified past in-

stances where it had invoked its inherent authority to
“approve[] aggregate or systemic relief . . . where public defenders were experiencing excessive caseloads or
where the offices were underfunded.”
Significantly,

the

Florida

Id. at 272-73.

Supreme

Court

also

acknowledged that unmanageable caseloads trigger ethical
rules governing conflicts of interest.

The Court con-

cluded that systemic relief was necessary to address the
“substantial risk that the representation of [one] or
- 8 -

more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client.”

Id. at 279; see

also American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Ethics Opinion 06-441 (requiring public defenders to decline new
cases if excessive workloads prevent make “competent and
diligent representation” impossible).
Missouri’s highest Court applied comparable reasoning in ordering systemic relief to address systemic
overloads of that state’s public defense systems.

Mis-

souri Public Defender Commission v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d
592, 599–601, 612 (Mo. 2012). The Court ordered systemic
relief by enforcing a state administrative rule allowing
defender agencies to decline appointment in specific
classes of cases. The Missouri Court, like the Florida
Court, expressly cited ethical rules proscribing conflicts of interest, which “inevitably” result from excessive caseloads. Id. at 607. Also like the Florida
Court, the Missouri Court invoked judges’ inherent “authority and . . . responsibility to manage their dockets
in a way that . . . respects” constitutional and ethical
requirements. Id. at 610-611. It is equally clear that
a case-by-case cure for the ongoing constitutional harms
in these tainted cases is wholly unworkable and must be
replaced with Petitioners’ requested system-wide solution.
- 9 -

Yet another case in which state courts applied a
systemic solution to systemic public defense overload is
Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, 81 A.D.3d 69, 914
N.Y.S.2d 367

(App. Div. 2011). In Hurrell-Harring, as

in the instant case, people who needed public defense
lawyers suffered the effective denial of counsel because
the system was too overloaded for existing counsel to
handle their cases. The New York courts reasoned that
such systemic breakdowns required a systemic response to
address the risks posed to “potentially tens of thousands of individuals” by inadequate public defense resources instead of forcing plaintiffs to pursue caseby-case relief. 81 A.D.3d at 71-73.

See also Nicholson

v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 240 (E.D. N.Y. 2002)
(“systemic barriers to effective representation” require
systemic remedies “without individualized proof of injury”; Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d
1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“systemic problems” with case
overloads make case-by-case remedies “totally inadequate”).
Similarly, in Duncan v. Michigan, the Court approved a systemic approach instead of forcing plaintiffs
to pursue case-by-case relief from “widespread and systemic instances of actual or constructive denial of
counsel” caused by case overloads and inadequate resources. 774 N.W.2d 89, 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) Most

- 10 -

recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also approved a systemic remedy to address systemic inadequacies

in

public

defense

resources.

Kuren

v.

Luzerne

County, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 2191 (September 28, 2016). There,
too, the state’s highest Court was called upon to address
the systemic denial of access to counsel due to case
overloads and insufficient staffing.

Id. at **16-24.

Like other courts considering the issue, Pennsylvania’s
highest court recognized that systemic problems require
a systemic response instead of individualized, case-bycase litigation, and allowed plaintiffs to proceed in
their quest for prospective equitable relief.

Id. at

*97.
These cases demonstrate that comprehensive, systemwide remedies are necessary and appropriate to correct
the system-wide wrong caused by misconduct of prosecution witnesses in Massachusetts. This Court should follow the lead of these sister courts, lest the current
and demonstrably inadequate case-by-case approach devolve as did Louisiana’s following that state’s Supreme
Court ruling in State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La.
1993).
Peart also involved systemic overload of public defense systems. In a grim parallel to Petitioners’ cases,
the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that these systems
were so swamped that people who needed public defense
lawyers “were entitled to a rebuttable presumption” that
- 11 -

their constitutional rights were being violated.
790, 791.

Id. at

Despite that indictment of the system, the

Court declined to order systemic relief and instead required case-by-case adjudication with the burden on indigent defendants to vindicate their rights.

Id. at

791.
In the two decades since that ruling, the harm from
the Court’s failure to order systemic relief from systemic flaws in the provision of public defense has only
compounded.

Louisiana currently faces an internation-

ally reported collapse of its public defense system.
See, e.g., Justice Denied: The Human Toll of America’s
Public Defender Crisis, The Guardian, September 7, 2016,
available

at:

https://www.

theguardian.com/us-

news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal

-justice-

system (last visited October 24, 2016).
The contrast could not be clearer between individualized, case-by-case attempts to cure systemic flaws
and the approaches of courts in Florida, Missouri, New
York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The case-by-case approach is “an ineffective mechanism for criminal defendants to obtain relief” for system-wide failure.

Effec-

tively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address
Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
1731, 1737 (2005). In contrast, courts, justice systems,
and the public benefit when systemic flaws are addressed

- 12 -

systemically. Examples of productive results from system-relief approaches include provision of resources
necessary to cure denials of access to counsel caused by
prior system overload.

See, e.g., Martha Ellen, St.

Lawrence County Is Awarded Indigent Defense Grant, Watertown (New York) Daily Times, August 10, 2013 (discussing new resources provided pursuant to Hurrell-Harring settlement).

As discussed below, the need for sys-

temic relief in the Dookhan cases is underscored by the
vitally important nature of the constitutional violations and rights at issue here.
II. TIMELY SYSTEMIC RELIEF IS NECESSARY TO CORRECT
SYSTEMIC VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
The need for systemic relief in the Dookhan cases is
further warranted by the significance of the systemic
constitutional violations at issue here. First, the Commonwealth

violated

basic

due

process

guarantees

by

tainting criminal prosecutions with fraudulent testimony
by state witnesses.

See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.

264, 269 (1959). Indeed, “[w]rongful conviction [is] the
ultimate sign of a criminal justice system’s breakdown
and failure[.]” Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d
217, 227 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).
Sadly, the initial constitutional wrong inflicted on
thousands of people in the Commonwealth is exacerbated

- 13 -

by an independent constitutional violation: inability to
access the courts, which is necessary to challenge their
tainted convictions. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
828 (1977) (describing right of access to courts as
“fundamental”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579
(1974) (same). This double due process denial is extraordinary. Petitioners cannot cure their wrongful convictions despite the benefit of this Court’s “conclusive
presumption” supporting a motion to vacate. For that
presumption to have any meaning, the defendants must be
able to file and pursue a motion to vacate their convictions in the courts.

Petitioners have shown that

this is not feasible due to systemic overload of the
public defense system. It is therefore necessary and
appropriate for this Court to order a systemic remedy.
It is equally important to emphasize that the fundamental nature of the constitutional rights at issue
supersede considerations of cost and convenience. See
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 512 (2004).

“Our ju-

risprudence does not ration constitutional rights based
on the financial cost of preserving and enforcing those
rights.”

Commonwealth v. Musser, 82 Va. Cir. 265, *5

(Va. Cir. 2011) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956)).
Yet the case-by-case approach to remedying the Dookhan crisis puts the burden on the people most directly
affected by government misconduct to vindicate their
- 14 -

rights. Unfortunately, the District Attorneys have made
that burden unbearable by issuing ineffective, obscure,
and confusing papers that fail to inform people of their
rights and how to vindicate them. SRA 79. Those papers
are so deficient as to make effective case-by-case adjudication impossible, even if the Commonwealth’s public
defense system were fully equipped for the task. It is
particularly shocking that those papers actually encourage recipients to contact the very prosecutors whose
interests demonstrably conflict with people who have
tainted convictions. That encouragement may be an acknowledgment that the Commonwealth’s defense system cannot respond effectively to the systemic overload created
by government misconduct. Regardless of the intended
meaning of these papers, their substantive deficiencies
are compounded by questions whether all eligible defendants received them as well as the unrealistic expectation that recipients can decipher the papers and respond
appropriately to correct government misconduct. All of
these factors contribute to an ongoing effective denial
of the right to be heard on a matter of vital importance.
Compounding this matter are the additional 18,000
Farak cases tainted by still more corruption in the Commonwealth’s forensic system. These thousands of cases
will only further strain an already overburdened criminal legal system. That new burden will exacerbate harms
already caused to the Dookhan defendants. All of these
- 15 -

harms are attributable to the Commonwealth.

They double

down on the systemic constitutional violations that
tainted these convictions in the first place, and further highlight the constitutional crisis created by the
inability of the Commonwealth’s public defense system to
assist the thousands of people whose plight Petitioners
have presented so clearly and comprehensively to this
Court.
This Court should not countenance any further delay
in ordering a systemic remedy for the “egregious” misconduct in these cases.

Just as it has long been rec-

ognized that courts have an “essential obligation to
provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental constitutional right, Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803)), it is
equally well established that “[j]ustice delayed is justice denied.” U.S. v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 923 (1st
Cir. 1988). Justice is being denied by the current caseby-case approach to remedying the Commonwealth’s misconduct.

The scope of the requested remedy is “propor-

tional to the scope of the violation.” Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 531 (2011). Immediate systemic relief is
the necessary cure.
It remains only to emphasize that, beyond being
unconstitutional, it is patently inequitable to demand
that defendants, particularly the low-income defendants
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who dominate the Dookhan cases, bear the burden of correcting the Commonwealth’s systemic failures.

Where the

State

evidence,

obtains

convictions

based

on

false

“[t]he State must bear the responsibility for the false
evidence.

The law forbids the State from obtaining a

conviction based on false evidence.”

Matter of Inves-

tigation of West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., 438
S.E.2d 501, 505 (W. Va. 1993).

Despite efforts to re-

solve these injustices on a case-by-case basis, experience shows that approach to be unworkable and constitutionally insufficient.

The responsibility to right

these wrongs must be borne by the Commonwealth, to whom
this Court has conclusively attributed them.

Faced not

with hundreds of individual motions, but instead with
tens of thousands of them, this Court should order system-wide relief now.

- 17 -

CONCLUSION
In Scott, this Court described the misconduct that
tainted the Dookhan cases as “particularly insidious …
form of government misconduct that has cast a shadow
over the entire criminal justice system,” and acknowledged the due process interests at stake in curing that
harm.

467 N.E.3d at 352. The time has come to rectify

that misconduct and fully vindicate those due process
interests. Experience has demonstrated that Petitioners’
request for system-wide relief is tailored to ongoing
and serious harm. This Court should order the Dookhan
convictions vacated with prejudice or with a severely
limited opportunity for district attorneys to justify
refiling charges in specific cases that are supported by
untainted evidence, and for the defense of which the
Commonwealth’s public defense attorneys have sufficient
resources to provide timely, quality representation.
Only such comprehensive relief can cure the serious constitutional

- 18 -

violations in these cases and begin to restore integrity
to the Commonwealth’s criminal justice system.
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October, 2016, I caused a true copy of the foregoing
document to be served by U.S. Mail and electronic mail
on the following counsel:
Matthew R. Segal
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
211 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02110
MSegal@aclum.org
Benjamin H. Keehn
Committee for Public Counsel Services
44 Bromfield Street
Boston, MA 02108
bkeehn@publiccounsel.net
Jean-Jacques Cabou
Perkins Coie
2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000
Phoenix, AZ 85012
JCabou@perkinscoie.com
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Vincent J. DeMore
Assistant District Attorney for Suffolk County
One Bulfinch Place
Boston, Massachusetts 02114
Quentin R. Weld
Assistant District Attorney for Essex County
10 Federal Street
Salem, Massachusetts 01970
Gail McKenna
Assistant District Attorney for Plymouth County
32 Belmont Street
Brockton, MA 02301
Robert J. Bender
Assistant District Attorney for Middlesex County
15 Commonwealth Avenue
Woburn, MA 01801
Susan M. O’Neil
Assistant District Attorney for Norfolk County
45 Shawmut Road
Canton, MA 02021
Robert Kidd
Assistant District Attorney for Bristol County
P.O. Box 973
888 Purchase Street
New Bedford, MA 02741
Brian S. Glenny
Assistant District Attorney for Cape and Islands
3231 Main Street
P.O. Box 455
Barnstable, MA 02630

ATTORNEY NAME
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